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Literature on migration and network eﬀects suggests that the rate of migra-
tion is positively related to the extent or degree of personal and community level
networks potential migrants have at the destination. However in this particular
paper it is shown that when the decision making unit is the extended family
and there is a minimum wage induced Harris-Todaro type job rationing in the
urban sector having greater numbers of previous migrants at the urban end
does not necessarily lead to more migration from the hinterland. This counter
intuitive result is generated as a consequence of juxtaposing an extended family
framework with urban equilibrium unemployment in the model. A larger stock
of previous migrants at the urban end has a positive eﬀect on new migration
which comes speciﬁcally through a greater ﬂow of remittance income from the
migrants to their rural counterparts - the two households comprising the ex-
tended family. The increased remittance income provides a positive stimulus
to migration as it relaxes the migration cost constraints facing the extended
family. On the other hand limited jobs in the urban sector and the resultant
job rationing implies that a greater number of previous migrants also crowds
out job opportunities for the new ones thus simultaneously reducing incentives
to migrate. The direction of the net eﬀect however depends on the economic
characteristics of the extended family and the initial employment conditions in
the urban sector.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In both the case of internal and cross border migration a widely observed pat-
tern is that people tend to ﬂock to areas or destinations which already have a
stock of previous migrants. Thus along with the neo-classical wage diﬀerential
motives behind labour mobility it is now widely accepted that the presence of
a pre established migrant community is also a key factor behind attracting new
migrants. Hence it has become imperative within the ﬁeld of migration studies
to analyze both the relationship between these established incumbents and the
prospective migrants and the mechanisms through which the latter facilitate
greater migration. There is a vast and growing literature on these so called
network eﬀects or externalities within the ﬁeld of anthropology, sociology and
economics.
Empirical investigation into the issue has analyzed the characteristics and
functioning of these networks. Banerjee (1984, 91) for example found that in
the sample survey of Delhi almost 85% of migrants had urban based contacts
which facilitated their migration from villages through the provision of infor-
mation about urban jobs, help in job search and also pre-arrangement of jobs.
A similar study on rural to urban migration in Pakistan by Frits Selier (1988)
divulged that almost all the respondents in the survey conducted in the city of
Karachi had friends or relatives already in the city who provided the ﬁrst place
of residence and initial monetary assistance. The author also found strong ev-
idence of the creation of ‘expanded families/households’ with economic ties in
the form of income transfers or remittances linking the migrants in the city to
the origin or native household. This latter eﬀect was highlighted in an earlier
paper by Caces et. al (1985) for both Manilla and Hawaii who examined the
role of spatially separated extended family units in facilitating more migration
through both income sharing within households and remittance linkage between
them. Thus in the whole migration dynamic, specially in the context of devel-
oping countries, the emergence of extended families, the ﬂow of remittances and
the establishment of networks are all closely connected.
Most of the theoretical literature on migration networks has tried to model
these network eﬀects by specifying the utility of the potential migrant as a
positive function of the stock of previous migrants. This acts as a catch-all term
for a wide range of beneﬁts including the social capital the networks provide
(see for example, Bauer. et. al (2002) and Heitmueller (2003)). Alternatively
the costs of migration are made endogenous or the informational externality is
modelled by making the employment rate of the new migrants a positive and
increasing function of the incumbents, (see Carrington et. al (1996), Winters
et. al (1999) and Graaﬀ (2003)). These studies almost always predict that at
least in the short run the presence of established migrant communities increase
the ﬂow of new migrants to urban areas. Although interestingly some of these
do indicate that increases in the stocks of previous migrants beyond a certain
threshold might actually reduce new migration as wages in the destination fall
and hence outweigh the positive network eﬀect (see Bauer et. al (2002) and
Graaﬀ (2003)).
2There is strong empirical evidence on rural to urban migration in developing
countries which suggests that migration leads to the formation of geographically
separated but economically linked extended family units (see Caces et. al (1985)
and Banerjee(1984, 91)). The established migrant household in the urban area
not only provides job related information and shelter to the new migrants but
also economic support to the origin or rural household in the form of remittances,
thus, in a way, complementing or taking on the role of community level networks.
Therefore in this particular paper we try to construct an analytical framework of
migration integrating both the extended family to the analysis of networks. The
model is setup within a Harris Todaro type urban environment of institutionally
ﬁxed wages and resultant unemployment. Hence, the so called network eﬀect of
migration has been analyzed in a general equilibrium type framework in which
changes in the stock of previous migrants not only inﬂuence migration decisions
and hence supply of new migrants directly, but, due to urban job rationing, also
have an impact on migration decisions through changes in the expected wages
of the new migrants.
The extended family in our model comprises of two households the urban
migrant, which consists of previous and new migrants, and the rural origin
household. Thus the migrant after leaving the countryside joins friends or rel-
atives in the urban migrant household which than acts as a support to the
migrant in the instance of unemployment as we assume income sharing within
the households. The link between these two households is maintained through
remittances ﬂowing from the migrants to their rural counterparts. Hence remit-
tances is an integral part of the extended family framework developed in the
paper allowing us to model what would be termed as the partial network eﬀect
in the subsequent analysis.
Throughout the analysis we assume that individuals and the family at large
is altruistic and therefore the decision of migration as well as remittance is based
on maximizing the welfare of the entire extended family. We believe that in light
of the empirical literature this extended family based approach in modelling mi-
gration is more comprehensive and hence closer to reality in analyzing migration
issues in the context of developing countries than the standard method of focus-
ing on individual decision making processes (see Stark (1985, 91) and Banerjee
(1981, 91)).
The similarity with the Harris Todaro analysis comes from the modelling of
the urban sector which for simplicity has been assumed to comprise of just one
formal sector in which the ﬁrms pay a ﬁxed minimum wage to its employees
hence resulting in a ﬁxed demand for labour and equilibrium unemployment,
another persistent feature in cities in the developing world. Due to this mini-
mum wage distortion and the resultant job rationing increases in the stocks of
previous migrants lowers the employment prospects for the new migrants and
thus subsequently eﬀects their supply. This is termed as the crowding out eﬀect
in the analysis. In the model we assume that labour in the urban sector con-
sists of just the migrants, the previous and the new, while the urban born are
the owners of capital. Thus in equilibrium we can determine the number of mi-
grants, the fraction of remittance, the employment probability and subsequently
3the output levels in both the sectors. The Harris-Todaro type migration deci-
sion and its impact on migration levels in the urban sector appears as a special
case of our framework.The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
In Section 2 we construct the model with the assumption of unemployment
in the new migrant group only. Subsequently in Section 3 the eﬀect of an
increase in the stock of previous migrants i.e., the network eﬀects of migration,
on equilibrium new migration levels and employment probability is carried out
under this assumption. In Sections 4 and 5 we modify our model by assuming
unemployment in both the migrant groups, which is similar to the standard
Harris Todaro assumption, and see whether the results obtained in Section 3
change qualitatively or not. The comparative static exercise is done under the
case of both exogenous and endogenous remittances.
2 The Model
There are two sectors urban (X) and rural (Y ) in the economy. The urban
competitive sector produces X units of output using both labour and a ﬁxed
capital endowment. The labour in the urban sector is assumed to comprise of
migrants only, which are further categorized into two distinct groups. The ﬁrst
group is the exogenously given endowment of previous migrants, M,in the urban
sector, and, the second are the endogenously determined new migrants, M, from
the rural sector. These two groups are assumed to inhabit one household in the
urban sector which we would refer to as the migrant household. Therefore the
total supply of labour in the urban sector is given by1
L = M + M (1)
The ﬁxed capital, K, in the urban sector is assumed to be owned exclusively
by the endowment of urban born native population, L, all of whom comprise
the urban born capitalist household. Assuming constant returns to scale the





; XL > 0,X LL < 0, (2)
where, e L, is the employed migrant labour force.
Now looking at the rural sector, for conceptual simplicity we assume that it
consists of a single household, where the total supply of labour is equal to the
total endowment of labour in that sector, l, minus the number of new migrants,
M,t h a ti s
l = l − M (3)
The household uses its labour, the only factor of production, to produce an
output, Y , given by the following constant returns to scale production function:
Y = Y (l − M); Yl > 0,Y ll =0 (4)
1In this model no distinction has been made in terms of skilled and unskilled workers in
the urban sector therefore implicitly we are assuming that the two groups, previous and new
migrants, are homogenous in terms of skills.
4We assume a small open economy where the product prices are exogenous
and without loss of generality assumed to be equal to one. Given exogenous
product prices the ﬁrms in the urban sector are assumed to be perfectly com-






where, W, is the institutionally ﬁxed urban minimum wage received by each
employed migrant in the urban sector.2
From (5) we can determine the ﬁrms demand for migrant labour, e L.N o w
as mentioned before, e L, constitutes the previous and the new migrants
e L = M + f M (6)
As is clear from above we assume here that the previous migrants are fully
employed in the urban sector while there is unemployment only amongst the
new migrant group as a consequence of the ﬁxed urban minimum wage. We
can justify this assumption on the grounds that the previous migrants are an
established group in the urban sector and hence are at an advantage over the
new migrants in terms of employment opportunities. Thus instead of assuming
a higher employment rate than the new migrants, in order to keep the analysis
simple, we restrict ourselves to the case of full employment amongst the previous







The above employment rate is also taken as the probability of employment
for the new migrants. As all previous migrants are employed, the numerator, f M,
are the residual jobs available for the new migrants, therefore the new migrants
take their speciﬁc employment rate as the relevant employment probability.
Now using (7) the income per capita of the members of the urban migrant
household, yM, and the rural household, yR, is therefore
yM =
∙










where, α, is the fraction of income the migrant household remits to the rural,
and, C, is the direct cost of migration of a family member which is borne by
2We maintain the standard Harris-Todaro assumption that the urban minimum wage, W,
is greater than the constant rural marginal product, Yl,t h a ti s ,W = XL >Y l.
5the rural household, hence CM is the total cost of migration. The per capita
utility levels of the members of the migrant household and the rural household
are given by their indirect utility functions:3
VM = VM(yM) and VR = VR(yR), (10)
where the indirect utility functions satisfy positive and diminishing marginal
utilities
V 0
M > 0;V 0
R > 0 and V 00
M < 0;V 00
R < 0 (11)
In this model the migrant household in the urban sector is assumed to be
the extension of the rural household, hence both the households make up one
extended family unit. The decision to migrate in this framework is made at the
family level, and we assume that the family size is large, so that, appealing to the
Strong Law of Large Numbers, we can assume away the existence of aggregate
uncertainty for the family, although new migrants face the probability of not
getting a job in the urban sector and individually each member of both the
households is risk averse.4 The extended family therefore decides the optimal
number of new migrants, M, to send to the urban sector by maximizing the
following utilitarian family welfare function which is the sum of the utilities of





VM +( l − M)VR (12)
Diﬀerentiating the above welfare function with respect to M using (8), (9)
and (10) and taking the probability, p, of getting a job as given we get the
following ﬁrst order condition, assuming that the solutions are in the interior:6
∂w
∂M
=[ VM −VR]+V 0
M[pW (1 − α)−yM]+V 0
R[yR −Yl +αpW −C]=0 (13)
The above migration equilibrium condition can be rewritten as
VM − VR = V 0
M[vM]+V 0
R[vR], (14)
3Here we are assuming that members of one household have the same preferences hence im-
plicitly we making the assumption that new migrants instantaneously change their preferences
upon arrival in the city.
Although we could have distinguished between the preferences of the new and previous
migrants in the urban sector, this would not however qualitatively change the results obtained
in the next section, though the ﬁrst order condition of migration would be slightly diﬀerent.
4For a similar assumption in the context of international migration see Lahiri and Fregoso
(2000).
5Since we assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty, we do not need to consider ex-
pected utility. If we did not make this assumption we would have to consider risk premium
which would entail possibly diﬀerent comparative static results than the ones derived in this
paper.












vM = yM − pW (1 − α) > 0,
and
vR = −yR + Yl − αpW + C ≶ 0
Now, vM, is the marginal cost of migration borne by each member of the
migrant household. It is the net deﬁcit to each member of the migrant household
resulting from marginal migration and is always positive.7 Similarly, vR,i st h e
net marginal cost of migration per member of the rural household including
both the direct and indirect costs of migration. Where, C, is the direct cost of
migration and, −yR + Yl, is the surplus or deﬁcit which the marginal migrant
produces for each member in the rural household, and, αpW,is what a marginal
migrant remits to the rural household and is therefore a negative cost (beneﬁt)
of migration. Hence in equilibrium the utility diﬀerential for the migrants,
VM − VR, or the marginal beneﬁt of migration is equal to the marginal costs
of migration given that these costs are shared equally between the respective
family members of the urban migrant and the rural household.
It has to be noted that the marginal cost to the rural household can be either
positive or negative, but, in the presence of high direct costs of migration and
low levels of initial income in rural areas, it is likely to be positive. Though,
there exists a theoretical possibility in our model that if these costs are negative
i.e., there are net beneﬁts accruing to the rural household from the departure of
a member, and if these outweigh the costs of migration to the urban household,
we would have a migration equilibrium, see (14), with the utility of the migrants
less than those of their rural counterparts.8 Hence we could have a scenario in
which the family sends a migrant even when the per-capita utility of the rural
household members is greater than that of the migrant, that is, the migrant is
worse oﬀ than his or her rural family members. This interesting possibility in
our model arises due to the fact that migration decisions are made at the level
of the family and not the individual. However we shall assume here that the
net marginal costs of migration to the rural household are positive, vR > 0,
so that VM − VR > 0. This condition simply ensures that there are gains from
migration.
This completes the description of the model.
3N e t w o r k E ﬀects and Equilibrium Migration
In this section we would analyze the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h en u m b e ro f
previous migrants on equilibrium levels of new migrants and their employment
probability with both exogenous and endogenous remittances. The equilibrium
7Substituting in, yM,we obtain:
vM =
M W (1 − p)(1− α)
M + M
> 0
8If vR < 0 and |vR| >v M.
7migration level and probability of employment or employment rate in our model
is simply determined by solving simultaneously the equation for the employment
probability derived from the ﬁrst order condition of ﬁrms and the implicit mi-
grant supply function derived form the ﬁrst order condition of migration.
3.1 The Case of Exogenous Remittances
The Function for the Employment Rate:
From (5) the ﬁrst order condition of proﬁt maximization we get the ﬁxed
demand for labour by ﬁrms in the urban sector given by:
e L = e L(W) (15)
Now substituting (15) into (6) using (7) and solving for p we get the following
explicit equation for the employment rate of new migrants as a function of the
new migrants, M, and the number of previous migrants, M :
p =










The above partial indicates that given a ﬁxed wage in the urban sector and
hence a ﬁxed employment level an increase in the number of new migrants
would result in a fall in their employment rate so as to maintain the number of
employed migrants, f M, constant.9







Now given the ﬁxed urban wage and hence employment level, an increase
in the number of the fully employed previous migrants would necessarily lead
to a decrease in the employment rate or probability of ﬁnding a job for the
new migrants. This latter eﬀect can be termed as the ‘crowding out’ of the
employment prospects of new migrants as a consequence of an increase in the
stock of fully employed previous migrants.
The Migrant Supply Function:
With remittances exogenous in the framework we can re-write the migration




Totally diﬀerentiating the above function we get
dw1 = w11dM + w12dp + w13dM =0 (18)
9The employment rate or probability graphically, is a rectangular hyperbola, the area under
which is constant: pM = f M (constant).
















The above partial eﬀect is:




















Therefore, given that w11 < 0, (SOC), we have:
∂M
∂p
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
dα=0
> 0
The migrant supply function is increasing in employment probability, ∂M/∂p >
0 ,s e e(20). That is holding M constant an increase in the probability of getting
a job would result in increased migration. The reason behind this is that an in-
crease in the probability of employment reduces the marginal costs of migration
for both the urban migrant and the rural household directly, stimulating more
migration, the ﬁrst two terms in (20). Secondly, the increase in p also raises the
income per capita of the urban migrant household and the remittance income of
the rural household therefore diminishing the marginal utility of income of its
members. Now in the presence of positive marginal costs of migration to both
the household (vR,v M > 0) this decrease in marginal utility reduces these costs
in terms of utility hence increasing migration, the last two terms in (20).
From (16) we can see that as an increase in the stock of previous migrants
would lower the employment rate of the new migrants, the crowding out eﬀect,
which would subsequently, from (20), dampen the level of new migration. Lit-
erature on network eﬀects does highlight a similar possibility in an environment
of perfectly ﬂexible labour markets at the destination and the homogeneity of
labour. The continued increase in the stocks of previous migrants by lowering
the wages at the destination would reduce the incentive for new migrants to
locate to that area (see Graaﬀ (2003) and Bauer et. al (2002)). In our model
it is the fall in expected urban wage rather than the actual wage which brings
about this negative eﬀect.
The Partial Network Eﬀect:
∂M
∂M






w13 = −V 00
M
∙
W(1 − α) − yM
M + M
¸






[vR] > 0 (21)
9As, w11 < 0, (SOC), we have:
∂M
∂M
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
dα=0
> 0
Now (21) captures what would be subsequently termed as the ‘partial net-
work eﬀect’ - ∂M/∂M -t h ee ﬀect on new migration levels due to an increase
in the number of previous migrants, M, with p constant. An increase in the
number of fully employed previous migrants would increase the income of both
the urban migrant and the rural household, the former directly and the latter
through an increase in the size of their remittance income. This increase in
income for both the households would subsequently reduce the marginal utility
of income of its members and in the presence of positive costs of migration (vR,
vM > 0) would reduce these costs in terms of utility therefore stimulating more
migration. This partial network eﬀect arises essentially from the modelling of
migration from an extended family perspective where changes in income of the
migrant household also have an impact on the incomes of the members of the
rural household through the remittance linkage. The increased amount of re-
mittances by increasing the income per-capita of the origin household facilitates
more migration by relaxing their direct and indirect migration cost constraint.
The existence of this particular type of network eﬀect can be corroborated
by empirical literature which indicates that rural households receiving more
frequent and higher remittance income from their established urban-migrant
households have a greater ability to ﬁnance the costs of sending new migrants
and hence display a greater propensity of migration relative to households which
either have no such pre-established urban satellite households or receive smaller
income supplements (see Caces (1985), Banerjee and Kanbur (1981) and Hodin-
nott(1994)).
In terms of modelling the network eﬀect the main diﬀerence between the
partial network eﬀect characterized here and that in the theoretical literature
surveyed in the last chapter is that ours is implicit in the extended family frame-
work while the standard exposition of it is more explicit. As mentioned in the
introduction in some literature the utility of the prospective migrant, amongst
other variables, is modelled to be an increasing function of the stock of in-
cumbents thus encapsulating all the positive externalities accruing to the new
migrants from having contacts at the destination (see Bauer et. al (2002)). In
others the direct costs of migration are made endogenous and decreasing in the
stock of incumbent migrants or the employment probability of new migrants is
speciﬁed to be an increasing function of previous migrants, (see Carrington et.
al (1996) and Graﬀ (2003)). While the former cost reducing eﬀect of networks
is captured somewhat indirectly by the partial network eﬀect, the latter posi-
tive employment probability eﬀect modelled in the literature however is exactly
opposite to that in our framework, i.e., the employment crowding out eﬀect.
It is worthwhile to note that if the fraction of remittance is assumed to be
zero, thus eliminating the link between the two households, the partial network
eﬀect, above, would still be positive. This is because an increase in previous
10migrants would still lower the positive costs of migration in terms of utility
facing the urban-migrant household members, that is










¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
α=0
> 0
Graphically this partial network eﬀect is a rightward shift of the migrant
supply function.
3.1.1 The Equilibrium
We can solve the function for the employment rate, (16), and the implicit mi-
grant supply, (19), simultaneously for equilibrium number of new migrants and









No. of New Migrants
The Employment 
Rate
Figure 1: The Equilibrium
Now before doing the comparative statics for the network eﬀect it has to be
mentioned that the equilibrium outcome of this model is ineﬃcient compared to
the standard ﬁrst best bench mark of allocative eﬃciency which, given exogenous
product prices, is characterized by the absence of any unemployment in the
11urban sector (p =1 ) , and, a labour distribution between the two sectors such
that the marginal products in both are equal, (XL = Yl). This social optimum
is depicted by the equilibrium point D on the Production Possibility Frontier
EDCF in the Fig. 2 below. This standard ﬁrst best benchmark can be derived
using either an ordinal speciﬁcation of a social welfare function or a weighted
utilitarian welfare function where the weights are chosen to be the inverse of the
marginal utility of income of each member of the economy.10
It is important to note here that the source of this ineﬃciency is the mini-
mum wage (W) regulation in the urban sector which prevents the urban labour
market from clearing and hence results in equilibrium unemployment amongst
the migrant labour ( p∗ < 1) and a labour distribution or equilibrium migration
between the sectors such that the urban minimum wage and hence marginal
product is greater than the rural marginal product, that is, W = XL >Y l,
resulting in a sub-optimal level of output in both the sectors. In the Fig. 2
below the ineﬃcient or sub-optimal equilibrium of our model has to lie along
the line ABC, such as the equilibrium point B.
3.1.2 Comparative Statics
















We can now determine the eﬀect of an increase in the number of previous
migrants on equilibrium migration and employment probability with exogenous
remittances by solving (23) and (24) simultaneously to obtain:
dM∗
dM























10Welfare of the society with exogenous product prices can be expressed simply by either
the sum of the outputs of both the sectors:
W = X + Y





















Sub-Optimal Eq. Due to 
Min. Wage : W= XL>Yl
Optimum Eq. 
XL* = Yl
Figure 2: The Optimum and the Minimum Wage Distortion
From (16) and (20), |J| > 0, hence a solution to the above two equations
exists. In (25) the ﬁrst term in the numerator is the positive partial network
eﬀect and the additional term is the negative employment crowding out eﬀect,
both of which have been discussed in detail. Now we would see the direction of
the overall eﬀect on equilibrium level of new migrants from an increase in the
stock of previous migrants by putting all the terms in the expression together.


























¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
dα=0
< 0
and substituting the above result into (23) yields
dp∗
dM
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
dα=0
< 0,
Proposition 1 With unemployment in the new migrant group only and exoge-
nous remittances an increase in the number of previous migrants would decrease
the equilibrium level of new migrants and their equilibrium employment rate in
the urban sector.
13Figure 3: The Net Eﬀect: Partial Network and the Crowding Out Eﬀect
The above result seems counter intuitive11 and rather strong as one would
expect higher migration levels owing to a greater stock of previous migrants
in the urban sector just appealing to the network eﬀects of migration. The
reason behind this surprising result is that, in this framework, an increase in
the stock of previous migrants has two simultaneous and opposite eﬀects on
new migration, the positive partial network eﬀect and the negative employment
crowding out eﬀect. The latter unambiguously dominates the former giving us
an equilibrium fall in new migration on account of an increase in the stock of
previous migrants, see the Figure above. Here we summarize these two partial
eﬀects again.
The so called partial network eﬀect stimulates more migration as an increase
in the stock of previous migrants increases the income of both the migrant and
the rural household, the former directly and the latter via an increase in the
total amount remitted. This increase in income by lowering the marginal utility
of income reduces the direct and indirect costs of migration in terms of utility
for members of both the households hence increasing migration. This partial
network eﬀect is shows as a rightward shift of the migrant supply function in
the ﬁgure.
The employment crowding out eﬀect comes through a fall in the employ-
ment rate or probability of new migrants as a consequence of an increase in the
11The counter intuition here arises from a careful dissection of the migration eﬀects, notably
the partial network eﬀect.
14numbers of fully employed previous migrants. The decline in the employment
probability or crowding out of employment subsequently induces a decrease in
the supply of new migrants which is simply a movement along the migrant sup-
ply function. The positive supply eﬀect or partial network eﬀect is not strong
enough to counter this large negative employment crowding out eﬀect there-
fore resulting in an overall fall in equilibrium level of new migration and also a
decline in the employment rate of the new migrants.
The intuition behind the dominance of the crowding out eﬀe c ti st h a tw h i l e
the partial network eﬀect works only through the decrease in the direct and
indirect costs of migration in terms of utility, the crowding out eﬀect on the
other hand by decreasing the employment rate for the new migrants not only
increases these costs in terms of utility but also increases these directly, see the
ﬁrst two terms in (20).
The result obtained above underscores the importance of the assumptions
made about the characteristics of the labour market in the urban sectors of
developing countries. The assumption of job rationing and migrant homogeneity
in terms of skills, i.e., they compete for the same job, along with the fact that
ours is a general equilibrium type framework where subsequent changes in the
employment rate also inﬂuence migrant supply, are the key driving force behind
this seemingly counter intuitive result.
Finally, although most of the literature on network eﬀects predicts new mi-
gration to respond positively to pre-established migrant communities at the
destination, there is theoretical literature which corroborates our results in a
dynamic framework of ﬂexible wages and homogenous labour. This literature
underlines the possibility of the negative eﬀect on migration coming from a fall
in the wages at the destination as a consequence of more previous migrants to
dominate the positive network externalities beyond a certain threshold stock of
previous migrant (see Bauer et. al (2002) and Graaﬀ (2003)).
3.2 The Case of Endogenous Remittance
The above analysis was done assuming exogenous remittances, now we would
analyze the eﬀect of an increase in the number of previous migrants on equi-
librium new migration level and employment probability when the fraction of
remittance is also determined optimally by the extended family. Before getting
into the comparative statics we would restate the optimality conditions.
Now the extended family simultaneously decides on the optimal number of
migrants, M, to send to the urban area and also the optimal fraction of remit-
tance, α, to send to the rural household. As before in making these decisions
the family does not take into account the eﬀect on the employment probability
in the urban sector of its actions. Therefore maximizing the welfare function,
(12), with respect to, M (as before), and, α, and assuming that the solutions
are in the interior we get the following ﬁrst order conditions:
∂w
∂M
=[ VM −VR]+V 0
M[pW (1 − α)−yM]+V 0




R − V 0
M =0 (29)
While (28) is the migration equilibrium condition same as before, (29) gives
the optimal remittance condition which states that the urban migrant household
would remit a fraction, α, of its income till the marginal utilities of both the
households are equalized.12 In this, V 0
R, is the marginal beneﬁtf r o mr e m i t t a n c e
to the rural household, and, V 0
M, is the marginal cost to the migrant. According
to this condition the fraction of remittance would increase with an increase in
income of the migrants and fall with an increase in income of the family - the
standard altruistic conception behind the motivations to remit.
There is a large body of empirical literature on the motivations to remit,
most of which gives at least partial credence to the altruism hypothesis. For
example Lucas and Stark (1985) in their analysis on Botswana concluded that
there is a mixture of both altruism and insurance in the observed remittance
behavior of migrants suggesting, what has been coined by Stark, a form of
‘tempered altruism’. Similarly Banerjee (1981) for the case of India, Hoddinott
(1994) for Kenya and Massey and Basem (1992) for Mexico came up with similar
conclusions. Though most of the literature indicates that at lower levels of
income of the migrant an increase in their income does increase remittances this
positive eﬀect tends to taper oﬀ at higher income levels suggesting a possible fall
in risk aversion of the migrants and hence a lesser need for insurance on their
part. Although, interestingly, when it came to a fall or loss in income of the
origin family most of the empirical ﬁndings indicate that the migrants respond
by increasing the fraction of remittance thus lending credibility to the altruism
hypothesis (see Kaufmann and Lindauer (1980) and Hoddinott (1994)).
The Migrant Supply Function and The Partial Network Eﬀect:
Now though the migrant demand function remains unchanged the migrant
supply function has to be derived again using the optimal remittance condition.
Therefore writing the above two conditions as functions:
w1 = w1(M,p,M,α) (30)
w4 = w4(M,p,M,α) (31)
Totally diﬀerentiating (30) and (31) we get:
dw1 = w11dM + w12dp + w13dM + w14dα =0 (32)
dw4 = w41dM + w42dp + w43dM + w44dα =0 (33)
12S.O.C:
∂2w










































Before we derive the remittance augmented migrant supply function, let us
ﬁrst see the additional partial eﬀects coming from endogenising the fraction of
remittance in the framework. Now the additional partial eﬀect is, ∂M/∂α =
−w14/w11, which is positive, as w11 < 0, and











The above additional partial eﬀect shows that an increase in the remittance
fraction would result in an increase in migration. The intuition behind this is
straight forward. An increase in the fraction of remittances from the migrant
household increases the income per capita of the rural household, which, by
lowering their marginal utility of income per capita, reduces the positive costs
of migration per head in terms of utility hence resulting in an increase in the
number of new migrants. Thus increase in remittances by increasing rural in-
come facilitates more migration. This positive partial eﬀect of remittances on
migration is in line with empirical literature on migration which shows that
relatively better oﬀ households or those with higher remittance income have a
greater ability to ﬁnance the costs of migration and hence would generally ex-
hibit a higher propensity of sending migrants to the urban areas (see Banerjee
(1981, 91), Hoddinott (1994) and Rozelle (1999)).
Now we would look at equation, (35), determining the ﬂow of remittances.
The partial eﬀects are the following, given that w44 < 0 (SOC):
























































17In (37) an increase in the number of new migrants would have an ambiguous
eﬀect on the optimal fraction of remittances. This is because marginal migration
leads to a fall in income of both the rural and the migrant household, thus
increasing the marginal utility of income of the members of the two households.
This entails a simultaneous increase in the marginal beneﬁt (V 0
R) and marginal
costs of remittances (V 0
M) rendering the partial eﬀect ambiguous. Also looking
at (38) and (39), an increase in employment probability and the number of
previous migrants raises the total remittance income of the rural household
therefore reducing the marginal utility of income and hence marginal beneﬁto f
remittance. At the same time the income of the migrant household also increases
which reduces their marginal utility of income and hence lowers the marginal
cost of remittance. Thus a simultaneous reduction in both the marginal costs
and beneﬁts of remittance results in the apparent ambiguity in the above partial
eﬀects.
Now Substituting dα from (33) into (40) and simplifying we get the following

































Now looking at the augmented slope of the migrant supply function, ∂M/∂p,



























































14From the concavity of the welfare function it follows that:
w11w44 − w14w41 = ∇





(l − M)(M + M)
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In the partial network eﬀect with endogenous remittances, ∂M/∂M, the


























≷ 0 and (∂M/∂α)(∂α/∂p) ≷ 0, the total
eﬀect of both, an increase in employment probability and the number of pre-
vious migrants on the supply of new migrants, the ‘partial network’ eﬀect, is
found to be positive.
3.2.1 Comparative Statics
Now we can look at the comparative static results given the function for the


























































T h e r e f o r ew eg e t
dM∗
dM






¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
α∗
≤ 0
19Proposition 2 When the amount of remittance, α, is chosen optimally by the
family an increase in the number of previous migrants would reduce both the
equilibrium probability of employment and the number of new migrants in the
urban sector unambiguously.
In the above analysis no particular assumption was made about the pref-
erences of the members of the extended family, implicit assumption being that
members of one household have the same preferences. Now we would see whether
t h er e s u l t so b t a i n e da b o v ec h a n g eq u a l i t atively or not if we assume the same or
homogenous preferences of members of both the rural and the migrant household
under endogenous remittances.
3.2.2 Homogenous Preferences
When the preferences of both the household members are identical, than look-
ing at the optimal remittance condition which states that in equilibrium the
marginal utility of income of both the households should be the same, (29),i t
is clear that with homogenous preferences this implies that the migrant house-
hold would remit to the rural household till the income per capita of both the
households are the same, i.e., yM = yR. Therefore substituting (29) into (28)
and putting yM = yR into the migration equilibrium we see that the marginal
beneﬁt of migration would go to zero and so would the net marginal costs of
migration, yielding the following simpliﬁed migration equilibrium condition:
∂w
∂M
= pW − Yl − C =0 (47)
The above condition is similar to the Harris-Todaro type migration equilib-
rium condition indicating that the extended family would keep on sending new
migrants till the expected wage in the urban sector is equal to the marginal
product in the rural sector plus the direct costs of migration. The similarity
here comes from the fact that in this model with endogenous remittances and
homogenous preferences the extended family becomes one large identical group
with the same income per capita and preferences which corresponds to the rural
household or labor force in the H-T model thus giving the same ﬁrst order
conditions.15 In the H-T model no distinction is made between migrant and
non-migrant groups and hence in their equilibrium the population proportion
in both sectors as well as equilibrium unemployment is determined and not the
number of employed and unemployed migrants explicitly.
N o ww ew o u l ds e et h ee ﬀect of an increase in the number of previous migrants
on equilibrium probability of employment and migration level in the urban sector
15It is worthwhile to note that in their seminal paper, as Harris and Todaro (1970) did not
distinguish between the urban born labour and the migrant labour, they assume that
“the typical migrant retains his ties to the rural sector and, therefore, the income that
he earns as an urban worker will be considered , from the standpoint of sectoral welfare, as
accruing to the rural sector” (Harris and Todaro (1970), page 127)).
The authors justify this assumption by highlighting the observed phenomenon of migration
leading to the emergence of extended family systems with remittances ﬂowing between the
migrant and the origin.
20respectively by solving explicitly for the equilibrium number of new migrants.
From the above ﬁrst order condition as W,Yl and C are constants we can solve
for M by substituting the equation for the employment probability:
p =
e L(W) − M
M
into the ﬁrst order condition of migration (47) to yield:
M∗ =
"


















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
α∗
=0
Proposition 3 If the preferences of the migrant and the rural household are
the same and remittances are endogenously determined than an increase in the
numbers of previous migrants would not eﬀect equilibrium employment probabil-
ity of new migrants but would unambiguously reduce the number of new migrants
in the urban sector.
With homogenous preferences and a constant marginal product, Yl,i nt h e
rural sector, the migrant supply function with respect to employment probability
becomes perfectly elastic and the partial network eﬀect of migration, i.e., shift in
the migrant supply function due to change in the number of previous migrants
is absent, see (47) and the ﬁgure above. Therefore, as the supply side eﬀects are
non-existent the change in equilibrium migration level comes only from change
in their employment rate, the negative crowding out eﬀect on the employment
prospects of new migrants. This leads to a fall in equilibrium number of migrants
exactly equal to this crowding out eﬀect with the employment probability of
migrants unaﬀected in equilibrium. Hence the net eﬀect on new migration as
a consequence of an increase in the population size of previous migrants under
this particular scenario is unambiguously greater than when remittances are
exogenous in the framework.
The results obtained above were rather strong mainly because of the as-
sumption of full employment in the previous migrant group. This assumption
led to a very strong negative crowding out eﬀect which dominated the positive
partial network eﬀect on new migration. In the following section we would carry
out a similar exercise but with the assumption of unemployment in both the
migrant groups (the new and the previous). This particular assumption brings
21Figure 4: The Full Crowding Out Eﬀect
our model closer to the standard Harris-Todaro analysis in which all members
of the urban labour force face the same employment probability given by the
urban employment rate. Therefore the objective here is to see whether this
particular change in the assumption regarding the employment characteristics
of the migrant groups in the urban sector causes any qualitative diﬀerences in
the results obtained earlier.
4A n E x t e n s i o n
All the main assumptions and equations from (1) to (5) of the model speciﬁed in
Section 2 apply here except now we assume unemployment in both the migrant
labour groups, the previous and the new. Therefore the employment probability,







Now using (48) the income per capita of the urban migrant household, yM,
and the rural household yR is:
yM = pW(1 − α) (49)
22yR =
µ




Where α as we know is the fraction of income the migrant household remits
to the rural, and, C, is the direct cost of migration of a family member which
is borne by the rural household, hence CM is the total cost of migration. As in
the previous model the per capita utility levels of the members of the migrant
household and the rural household are given by their indirect utility functions:16
VM = VM(yM) and VR = VR(yR), (51)
which exhibit positive and diminishing marginal utilities:
V 0
M > 0;V 0
R > 0 and V 00
M < 0;V 00
R < 0 (52)
The decision of migration is made at the level of the extended family, the
rural and the migrant household and as done before we assume that the family
size is large, hence, appealing to the strong law of large numbers we assume away
the existence of any aggregate uncertainty for the family.
Therefore maximizing the same utilitarian family welfare function, see (12),
with respect to the number of migrants M and taking the probability of em-
ployment as given we get the following ﬁrst order condition assuming that the
solutions are in the interior:17
∂w
∂M
=[ VM − VR]+V 0
R[yR − Yl + αpW − C]=0 (53)
The above migration equilibrium condition can be rewritten as:
VM − VR = V 0
R[vR], (54)
where
vR = −yR + Yl − αpW + C
As before, vR, is the marginal cost of migration per member of the rural
household including both the direct and indirect costs of migration. This is
identical to the marginal cost to the rural household in the previous model
and is assumed to be positive hence ensuring gains from individual migration,
VM−VR > 0. Thus in equilibrium the utility diﬀerential for the migrants VM−VR
or the marginal beneﬁt of migration is equal to the marginal cost of migration
to the rural household given that this cost is shared equally between the rural
household members. The diﬀerence between the above ﬁrst order condition and
that derived for the previous model is that in this case there are no marginal
costs of migration to the urban household and therefore the total marginal costs
of migration in this framework are less than in the previous model.
16Similar to the case in the previous model if we assume diﬀerent preferences of the new and
previous migrants the comparative static results obtained are not qualitatively diﬀerent and








235N e t w o r k E ﬀects and Equilibrium Migration
Now as done in the case of the ﬁrst model we would analyze the eﬀect of an
increase in the number of previous migrants on equilibrium migration and em-
ployment probability ﬁrst with exogenous remittances and than with endoge-
nous remittances to see whether there are any major qualitative diﬀerences in
results. As in this model there is unemployment in both the migrant groups,
the function for the employment rate would have to be restated and the mi-
grant supply function re-derived because of the diﬀerent ﬁrst order condition of
migration.
5.1 The Case of Exogenous Remittances
The Function for the Employment Rate
From (5) the ﬁrst order condition of proﬁt maximization we get the ﬁxed
demand for labour by ﬁrms in the urban sector given by
e L = e L(W) (55)














The above partials indicate that given a ﬁxed wage in the urban sector and
hence a ﬁxed employment level an increase in the number of new migrants would
lead to a fall in the probability of getting a job or the employment rate in the
urban sector, so as to maintain the number of employed, e L, constant.








A sw a st h ec a s ei nt h ep r e v i o u sm o d e la ni n c r e a s ei nt h en u m b e ro fp r e v i -
ous migrants would necessarily lead to a decrease in the employment rate or
probability of getting a job for the new migrants. It has to be noted here that
the increase in the stock of previous migrants would have a lesser impact on
the employment rate than was the case be f o r ea si nt h i sp a r t i c u l a ri n s t a n c ea
portion of these would go into the unemployment pool therefore diminishing the
previously large employment crowding out eﬀect. We can look at this dampened
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24.
The Migrant Supply Function:
As the migration equilibrium condition is now slightly diﬀerent we would
have to re-derive the implicit migrant supply function. The method of derivation
is identical to the previous case but the partial derivatives with respect to the
ﬁrst order condition of migration (53) would be diﬀerent. Therefore we would
restate the resulting implicit migrant supply function in its general form again
















Now in the above, w11 < 0, and
w12 = V 0
M[W(1 − α)] + V 0










¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
dα=0
> 0
The migrant supply function, (58), is increasing in employment probability,
w12 > 0 as an increase in the employment probability not only increases the
income per capita and hence utility of the migrant household (increase in the
marginal beneﬁt of migration), ﬁrst term in (58), but also reduces the marginal
costs of migration directly for the rural household, second term, and by increas-
ing the expected income through remittances reduces the costs of migration in
terms of utility for the rural household, last term, resulting in an increase in
migration.
The Partial Network Eﬀect:
∂M
∂M












[vR] > 0 (59)
Given, w11 < 0, we get
∂M
∂M
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
dα=0
> 0
The above partial network eﬀect is similar to that in the last model, an
increase in the stock of previous migrants results in an increase in the amount
of remittances ﬂowing to the rural household. This increase in the rural income
per-capita reduces their positive direct and indirect costs of migration (vR) in
25terms of utility hence enabling the extended family to send more migrants to
the urban sector.
The diﬀerence between the partial network eﬀe c ta b o v ea n dt h a ti nt h e
previous model is that here there are no marginal costs of migration to the
migrant household, vM =0 , hence the additional cost reducing eﬀect to the
migrant household from an increase in previous migrants is non-existent. Also,
in this particular model in the absence of remittances from the framework (α =
0) the partial network eﬀect, see (59), would be simply zero:
∂M
∂M
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
α=0
=0
As mentioned before the link between the migrant and the rural household
is through remittances and if we put α =0than an increase in the number of
previous migrants has no eﬀect on rural income, therefore as the rural incomes
remain unaﬀected the partial network eﬀect in this case is simply zero. This
is in contrast to the last model where even with zero remittances the partial
network eﬀect was positive because of the presence of positive marginal costs
of migration (vM > 0) facing the migrant household, see (22). Hence with a
non-existent supply side network eﬀect the only impact on new migration from
an increase in past migrants would be the negative employment crowding out
eﬀect. Therefore in this particular case with no remittances we would obtain an
overall unambiguously larger negative comparative static result of an increase
in the stock of previous migrants on equilibrium new migration level.
5.1.1 The Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
















We can now determine the eﬀect of an increase in the number of previous
migrants on equilibrium migration and employment probability with exogenous
remittances by solving (60) and (61) simultaneously to obtain:
dM∗
dM















where from the above partials |J| > 0.
Now the numerator in the above expression capturing both the partial net-
























¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
dα=0
< 0,
Proposition 4 With unemployment amongst both the migrant groups and with
exogenous remittances an increase in the number of pervious migrants would
reduce equilibrium number of new migrants in the urban sector unambiguously.
Also in this particular case we have seen that if the fraction of remittance is
zero than the partial network eﬀect is absent, hence the only eﬀect on equilib-















Therefore we can state the following additional proposition:
Proposition 5 With unemployment in both the migrant groups if the fraction
of remmittance from the migrants to the rural members is zero than this would
lead to a complete absence of the partial network eﬀect thus leading to a greater
fall in equilibrium number of new migrants as a consequence of an increase in
past migrants.
The Figure below captures the total eﬀect with zero remittances:
5.2 The Case of Endogenous Remittances
The Migrant Supply Function and The Partial Network Eﬀect:
As done in the previous section we would ﬁrst show a general result under
endogenous remittances and than look at the case of homogenous preferences of
the extended family members. Now with endogenous remittances the migrant
supply function has to be re-derived using the ﬁrst order condition of migration
and the optimal remittance condition. The ﬁrst order condition of migration is
speciﬁed in (53), and, the optimal remittance condition for this modiﬁed model
is the same as the one derived in the last model, see (29), which states that the
migrant household in the urban sector would remit a fraction α of its income
to the rural household till the marginal utility of the members of both the
households are equalized. Before deriving the implicit migrant supply function
using both the ﬁrst order conditions of migration and remittances, we shall look
at the partial eﬀects coming from these two conditions. As done previously























Now as before with endogenous remittances the additional partial eﬀect on
migration is positive as:











Again an increase in the fraction of remittances would raise rural income
per capita and hence reduce the positive marginal costs of migration in terms
of utility resulting in an increase in migration.
N o ww ew o u l ds e et h ei n d i r e c te ﬀect coming from endogenising remittances
by looking at the following partials derived from (66).
Given w44 < 0 (SOC),




































In the partial, see (68), as marginal migration decreases the per-capita in-
come of the rural household, vR > 0, it leads to an increase in the rural marginal
utility of income which entails that the marginal beneﬁto fr e m i t t a n c ew o u l d
rise thus resulting in an increase in the remittance fraction. With respect to
employment probability, see (69), as both rural and migrant income increase
the net eﬀect on remittances would be ambiguous.
However the eﬀect on remittances from an increase in previous migrants is
unambiguously negative, see (70). The intuition here is that a greater stock
of previous migrants in this case would only increase the income of the rural
members through higher remittance decreasing therefore their marginal utility
of income and hence the marginal beneﬁt of remittance which thus entails a fall
in the optimal fraction remitted. Thus when remittances are endogenous in the
framework an increase in the stock of previous migrants would by increasing the
total remittance to the rural household improve its economic standing and hence
reduce its need for more remittances. As mentioned earlier most of the empirical
literature on remittance does support this hypothesis, remittances from migrants
are shown to increase (decrease) in response to a negative (positive) ﬂuctuation
in the income of the origin household (see Kaufman and Lindauer (1986) and
Hoddinott (1994)).
Now from (67), (69) and (70) the additional eﬀect on migration from endo-
genising remittances is ambiguous with respect to the employment rate, (∂M/∂α)(∂α/p) ≶





0, therefore dampening the direct partial network eﬀect. As done in the previous
section from (65) and (66) we derive the following augmented migrant supply
































Where from the concavity of the welfare function the denominator in ∂M/∂p








































¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
α∗
> 0
Hence the remittance augmented migrant supply function is increasing in
employment probability. Also, the partial network eﬀect with endogenous remit-
tances is positive although the additional eﬀect from endogenising remittances
was negative.
Comparative Statics:
Therefore now we can simultaneously solve the migrant demand function
(56) and the migrant supply function (71) to get the comparative static results,
assuming as before that an equilibrium (p∗,M∗) exists. From (45),a s|J| > 0,
and in the numerator the entire expression capturing the partial network and










































¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
α∗
≤ 0
Proposition 6 With unemployment in both the migrants groups and with en-
dogenous remittances an increase in the stock of previous migrants would un-
ambiguously decrease the equilibrium level of new migrants and the employment
rate in the urban sector.
Hence with unemployment in both the migrant groups and with endogenous
remittances we also get a negative eﬀect on equilibrium migration. Now we














With homogenous preferences of the urban migrant and the rural household,
given the optimal remittance condition (29), which states that the marginal
utility of income of members of both households should be the same in equi-
librium, we would necessarily have an equality of income per capita of both
households. Therefore substituting, yM = yR, in the migration equilibrium
condition, (53), we get the following reduced ﬁrst order condition of migration:
∂w
∂M
= pW − Yl − C =0 (74)
The above migration equilibrium is the same as the one derived in the pre-
vious model with unemployment in the migrant group only. So the family keeps
on sending migrants to the urban sector till the expected wage equals the rural
marginal product plus the direct cost of migration. We would therefore expect
the results to be similar to the ones obtained for the previous model. Now given










from the above we get
dM∗
dM
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
α∗
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α∗
=0
Proposition 7 With endogenous remittances when the preferences of the mi-
grant and the rural household are the same than an increase in the number of
previous migrants would not eﬀect the equilibrium employment probability in the
urban sector but would reduce the number of new migrants in equilibrium.
Therefore with homogenous preferences the migrant supply function becomes
perfectly elastic and an increase in the number of previous migrants has no eﬀect
on migrant supply, see (74). In the absence of a positive supply side network
eﬀect the only eﬀect which comes through is the employment crowding out eﬀect
which by lowering the employment prospects of the new migrants induces a fall
in equilibrium number of new migrants in the urban sector.
316C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we developed an extended family framework of migration within
a Harris-Todaro type urban setting in order to determine the so called network
eﬀect on equilibrium new migration levels in the urban sector. We constructed
a model in which initially the supply of migrants came from the extended family
jointly maximizing a welfare function with respect to the number of migrants
only. Subsequently the migrant supply function was augmented by endogenising
the fraction of remittances. The employment rate of the migrants was derived
from the ﬁrst order condition of proﬁt maximization of ﬁrms. In this simple
framework with ﬁxed minimum wages in the urban sector the function for the
probability or rate of employment and the migrant supply could be solved si-
multaneously for the equilibrium level of migrants and also the employment rate
in the urban sector.
The results obtained in Section 3 and 5 of the paper seem initially counter
intuitive and against the conventional ideas on network eﬀects. In most of the
theoretical and empirical literature on network eﬀects the central beneﬁto fh a v -
ing friends or relatives in the urban sector is through the transmission of positive
information about job availability, the help in job search activity pre and post
migration and the initial support extended to the new migrants from relatives in
cities. Hence in the theoretical models the network eﬀect is either captured by
making the utility of the prospective migrants a positive function of the stock
of previous migrants or by making the employment prospects of migrants and
the costs of migration endogenous and dependent on the incumbents.19
In our model the positive partial network eﬀect came primarily through
the change in incomes and hence the direct and indirect costs of migration
in terms of utility of both the migrant and the rural household members on
account of changes in the stock of previous migrants. The positive eﬀect on
rural incomes was brought about by the increase in the amount remitted as a
direct consequence of a greater number of previous migrants. This increase in
rural income facilitated the family at the origin to ﬁnance the positive costs of
migration hence resulting in the extended family sending more of its members
to join the urban migrant household. Thus the modelling of migration in terms
of the extended family allowed us to characterize the partial network eﬀect in
the analysis.
Now as the urban sector was modelled on the lines of the standard H-T
type framework, i.e., ﬁxed wage, homogenous labour in terms of skill and urban
unemployment, the two migrant groups, the previous and the new, essentially
competed for the same job due to migrant labour rationing. Thus the pres-
ence of greater numbers of previous migrants resulted in the crowding out of
the employment prospects of new migrants, that is, a fall in their employment
probability. This decline in employment probability therefore led to the nega-
tive eﬀect on new migration which was found to be greater than the positive
partial network eﬀect leading to an overall fall in the equilibrium number of
19See Carrington, et al (1996), Winters, et al (1999), Bauer et. al (2002) and Graaﬀ (2003).
32new migrants. This result was consistent under both the case of unemployment
only in the previous migrant group and with unemployment in both the new
and previous migrants.
In line with the results of this paper there is literature on network eﬀects
which highlights the possibility of the negative eﬀect on migration, coming from
a fall in the urban wage rates as a consequence of more previous migrants, to
dominate the positive network externalities beyond a certain threshold level of
previous migrant stock, (see Bauer et. al (2002) and Graaﬀ (2003)). Moreover,
there is a large body of work on both the network eﬀects and the welfare impli-
cations of migration on the destination or host country which focuses on more
migration leading to employment crowding out or fall in wages of previous or
incumbent migrants and the indigenous labour force (see Heitmuller (2003), and
Frieber and Hunt (1995)).
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